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In Defense of Ho(s)tel: Islamophobia, Domophilia, Liberalism

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ABSTRACT I foreground the reconstituted notion of ‘nation-state-as-home’ as central to our understanding of the hostility to and fear of Muslims, Islamophobia, in the contemporary west and beyond. The reconfiguration of the quest from a ‘heavenly home’ into an ‘earthly home’ – a prime signature of secular modernity – led to the consolidation of the nation-state as sort of a ‘natural’ home generating a new kind of love: domophilia – domo + philia, love for home. This love for home, domo, stemming from the Indo-European linguistic root, dem – a zone of possession and imagined security – derives its sustenance from its constitutive obverse, foris/foras, outsider and stranger. What simultaneously connects and separates the two is hostility often manifest, inter alia, in war. Discussing the condition of Muslims in the west and in India, this article aims to demonstrate the complex intimacy between domophilia and Islamophobia. Public expression of Islamophobia, I argue, is not a deviation from but constitutive of liberalism. It is my contention that much of the talk about Muslims’ ‘integration’, verily a moderate word for assimilation, is less than adequate to meet the ever-growing challenge of Islamophobia. We need a significantly new way of imagining politics anchored in a ho(s)tel, not in the hegemonic established sense of a ‘home-as-nation-state’ which carries seeds of violence.

When... many companies support mass immigration... including Muslim immigration, this means that they contribute to Islamisation, at home and abroad.

We should rather be protecting our own democracies at home against Islam.

It is unrealistic to believe that we can save Europe through democratic struggle from a future reality where Muslims will be in the majority.

Just like in Lebanon, the Muslims will become overconfident in Germany, the UK and France... Europeans... will begin to wage a guerrilla war... We [European nationalists] will win [for]... we have nowhere to go, while our colonisers [Muslims] still have their homelands intact.

When the Muslim populations have been expelled from Europe, we will have rather large unpopulated areas in Albania, Western Anatolia and Lebanon with

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the capacity to offer a permanent home (territory) to several Christian minorities.
(Andrew Berwick [Anders Behring Breivik])1

Introduction

Amsterdam: April 2008. I boarded the Berlin-bound train. After it passed the Dutch border, the train stopped. Two security personnel entered the train. In my compartment I was the only non-white. And I alone was asked to show my passport and residence permit. After a few halts when the train again stopped, a lady arrived to take her seat beside mine. Let me call her Gudrun. We exchanged a smile. I continued reading until Gudrun gently interrupted me to ask where I was from. ‘Holland’, I said. Dissatisfied with my response, she asked, ‘Where are you originally from’. ‘India’, I replied.

My response evoked a deep interest in Gudrun. She told me how great Indian culture was and that she loved it. In particular, she liked the image of lord Ganesha and practiced yoga. She had never been to India, however. She had briefly lived in Sri Lanka. She asked me which god I worshipped. Without awaiting my reply she continued her admiration of India. Gudrun knew about Sikhs too. She saw a Sikh for the first time when the Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s entourage passed (in the early 1990s) through the neighborhood of Berlin where she lived. Seeing the ‘strange-looking’ Sikh security official accompanying Rao’s cavalcade, she felt ‘awkward’. She had lived in that neighborhood since her birth. It was only during World War II that she temporarily lived out of Berlin when Gudrun’s father had sent her to her relations in Bavaria. As a Protestant she was dismissive of the ‘superstitious’ Bavarian Catholics with whom she spent her late childhood. She described herself as ‘rational’ and ‘secular’.

As our conversation went on, Gudrun said how unsafe she felt ‘now’ living in Berlin. ‘There are many women with strange dress in the streets. Wearing scarves is not in our culture. Islamic faith represses women... Until late in the evening Turkish boys hang out in the streets. They cast suspicious glances at us’. ‘Why do you feel unsafe; have they attacked you’, I asked. ‘No, but they beat their own women’, she said disgustingly. Even though she herself had never been attacked she felt unsafe because they wanted, as she put it, ‘to impose Islam on Germany’. ‘Turks want to make our home like theirs’, she held.

During our conversation I was mostly a listener. When I asked her if any Turk had said that he desired taking over Germany, she answered it in the negative, elaborating that Turks had two ‘tongues’ – one they use when talking to ‘us’, the other when they talk among themselves. For Gudrun, unlike me, it was too obvious to be stated. If I had been to Berlin before, she said, I must have observed the tremendous rise in number of mosques in the city. ‘Their minarets are getting taller than our churches’, she observed. At this point, I noticed a dash of unease on her face. She abruptly turned silent. After a while, she asked me if I was a Muslim. ‘Is it relevant?’, I said. What followed was an eerie silence until the train reached Berlin and we went our own way.

Lucknow, India: April 2007. For the UP state elections, with much fanfare the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – the key proponent of anti-Muslim Hindu nationalism in the democratic-electoral arena – released a CD to woo voters. The idea for ‘a high voltage short film [CD] targeting Hindu sentiments in a big way’ was well under way at its Lucknow

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convention (in December 2006) where the BJP resolved to regenerate its ideology of Hindu- 
tutva, or Hindu nationalism.\(^2\) The film opens with the BJP’s flag unfurling, and announcing: ‘The BJP . . . presents Bhārata kī pūkār [The Call of India].’\(^3\) Its symbol – the lotus – is shown blooming and it remains on the top left of the screen throughout. The female voice- 
over is juxtaposed with an assemblage of images – beginning with the image of a Hindu 
goddess inscribed in the heart of the territorial map of India (with the Hindutva saffron 
flag implanted in the map), and trains, jeeps, settlements set on fire by ‘Muslim terrorists’.
Thus begins the voiceover:

Mother India is crying aloud today. Oh my sons, protect me from being torn asunder. I no longer have the strength to be enslaved again. Through terrorists and by spreading fear and dividing us, Pakistan wants to tear India apart . . . Now . . . people of India have to decide if they again desire slavery or Ram Rajya [the Hindu rule] in their independent India.\(^4\)

The voiceover ends with the image of the god Ram, armed with an arrow and bow. A new chorus voiceover begins to sing the anti-Muslim nationalist song ‘vanda matram’.\(^5\) This is followed by another male chorus voiceover singing ‘o’ mother India, we bow your head at your feet’ and that ‘today we swear that we will never let the tricolor [the Indian flag] be lowered’. The chorus is accompanied with images of the top BJP leaders, a few of them pic-
tured with Indian landscape in the backdrop and making passionate speeches.

With this preface, the story unfolds. A newspaper vendor shouts: bomb explosions in Kashmir, attacks on Akshardham temple, a train exploding. In response, an elderly man says: ‘the terrorists will but destroy this nation (deśh)’. A pair of bloodthirsty eyes (with face veiled) is shown throwing a bomb, causing explosions and cries for help. Instantly there appears a text on the screen: ‘The Indian nation in the grip of terrorism’.

The film refers to India as a nation, depicting it as a neat cartographical entity, and equat-
ing it with Hinduism. Those determined to tear the nation asunder are Muslims. This is shown through a series of tropes. In a news clip inserted into the story, a Hindu female leader in saffron robe roars: ‘Hindus produce two kids but Muslims marry five times, produce 35 puppies and thus want to make this country into an Islamic state’. Notice the words. Hindus produce kids, Muslims produce puppies, which will convert India into an Islamic state. This demographic bomb is lethal not only to Hindus but also to Muslim women waiting to be liberated from the tyranny of their religion. The female leader’s speech is prefaced with an encounter between a Muslim woman (in black chador) and a Hindu schoolmaster, the key protagonist campaigning for the BJP. He asks her to vote for the BJP as ‘the government of the Congress and the Samajwadi [parties] is the government of the mullahs’. The camera then shows a conversation amongst Muslim women (in black chador) one of whom says that their leaders have ‘ordered them to produce more than 10 children’ and ‘increase the [Muslim] population’. The conversation ends with the camera back to the encounter between the schoolmaster and the Muslim woman who says: ‘This religion [Islam] regards us as sheer objects of

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\(^3\)In transliterating Urdu and Hindi words, I have largely followed the Annual of Urdu Studies journal guidelines, also available online, http://www.urdustudies.com/pdf/22/01TitleTranslit.pdf (accessed 18 November 2012).

use’. The schoolmaster joyfully responds: ‘Bravo (shābbāsh) my child! If all women become educated and wise like you this country’s fate will radically alter’.

This article is divided into three sections. In the first section, I lay out key elements of my argument. I suggest that the reconstituted notion of ‘nation-state as home’ ought to be pivotal to our understanding of the hostility to and fear of Muslims, Islamophobia, in contemporary west and beyond. Both in India and west prejudices against Islam have long existed; however, with the onset of nation-thinking they became at once national and civilizational. Here I engage with recent anthropological writings on Islamophobia to critique the dualism between nation and civilization. I contend that the nation-state continues to be relevant in the face of globalization. In the second section, I use a historical anthropological approach to situate the rise of the nation-state and how it became synonymous with ‘society’ and ‘home’. Based on the histories of Australia and India, I show how the equation of home with the nation-state came about. This equation, however, was neither simple nor peaceful. It was fraught with violence for while in Australia it rendered the Aboriginal population ‘homeless’, in India it generated the demand for a separate ‘home’ for Muslims, Pakistan. Here I stress how nation became the axis of our thinking to the extent that knowledge itself became nation-statized. The rest of the section is devoted to the Indo-European linguistic exposition of the constitutive ‘other’ of home, the outsider/the foreigner/the stranger and its link with territory, property and possession. To this end, I critically discuss writings on Islam in Europe. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, I conclude this section with an alternative genealogy of home which, in the wake of atom bomb and the consequent possibility for the entire humanity to commit suicide, conceives of the entire earth as home (domo). In the third and concluding section, I argue that Islamophobia is not a deviation from but constitutive of liberalism. I caution against the doxa that Muslims’ ‘integration’ will lessen Islamophobia and that they will get integrated into ‘home (the west)’. As an alternative and inspired by Franz Kafka’s thought, I suggest replacing the dominant notion of nation/home with hostel, if not hotel.

The Argument: Why Domophilia?

How does one unpack the portrayal of Muslims in the BJP’s film and in the discourse of Gudrun? Importantly, is there a connection between the depictions of Muslims by the BJP in India and those by Gudrun in Germany – two vastly different countries separated by thousands of miles? Most writings on Islamophobia in the west rarely make a connection to the Indian situation and vice versa. Forging the connection between the two might offer a new window to unpack the phenomenon of Islamophobia. Both in the west and India, it is the movements and discourses of nation-making and nation-preserving — the quest for and crafting of a pure, cohesive and cozy home, nation — which predominantly accounts for Islamophobia. Prejudices against Islam and Muslims obviously predate nationalism. However, with the onset of nationalism the prejudices assumed a specific form; they became at once national and civilizational (see below). The key difference between Islamophobia in India and in the west is this: while in India Muslims for over two centuries have been made to serve as both historical symbolic and empirical other of the nation, in the west Muslims also became an empirical, non-distant other only in the post-World War II era with their migration as cheap, docile labor from the erstwhile colonies. That which had been so far away became so close. Brought as temporary guests, circumstances made them permanent residents of a home/nation historically fashioned with Islam and Muslims as one of the significant others.

The BJP election CD, given by Yoginder Sikand, is in my personal library.
By Islamophobia if we mean hostility to and fear of Muslims, there is barely new substance to this phenomenon. From Martin Luther through Karl Barth to Geert Wilders, there is an established tradition of ‘othering’ of Islam in the west. And this by no means is simply born out of sheer ignorance. In my view, what is new and distinct about current Islamophobia is that, unlike in the past, from 1960s onwards, Muslims as the significant other are no longer there far-away – in the Middle East, Asia, Africa – they have come to ‘our home’ called Europe and its different nation-states. It is this century-old notion of home or nation and its perceived de-stabilization by Muslims’ residence and presence that may enable us to better understand the current Islamophobia. In the west, non-state terror and suicide bombings are fervently discussed not because they are primarily novel political phenomena; after all terror has been part of the non-west for decades in places like India, Sri Lanka and Uganda. Rather they are also discussed publicly (privately as well) because terror has reached ‘home’, the west, in the same way commentators discuss Islamophobia today because Muslims no longer live just in the Middle East, Africa or Asia; rather, they have come home, the west. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s statement succinctly captures how the threat of terrorism is primary to the west, home, and only secondary to the non-west, overseas. ‘As the Australian government has said consistently there is an enduring threat from terrorism, at home, here in Australia, as well as overseas’. The distinction of my argument will become more evident with an engagement with Matti Bunzl’s writing on Islam in Europe. In 2005, Bunzl wrote an article ‘Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe’, to which many anthropologists responded. According to Bunzl, ‘at the heart of the Islamophobic discourse... is the notion that Islam engenders a worldview that is incompatible with and inferior to western culture’. In Bunzl’s view, ‘Islamophobia has emerged quite recently. It is a phenomenon of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’. But if ‘othering’ of Islam/Muslims and the fear thereof is central to Islamophobia, then surely it is not as novel as Bunzl makes it out to be. Edward Said’s Orientalism (absent from Bunzl’s discussion) demonstrates the working of this attitude in the western discourses for centuries. Gingrich is thus right in critiquing the novelty Bunzl assigns to Islamophobia. He asks us to go back to the colonial era to trace the discourse of orientalism in different forms in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe and the history of different European nationalisms to understand the ways in which their ‘wider ideological inventory’ was shaped by the figure of the ‘bad Muslim alien’. Likewise, John Bowen contends that ‘the whole complex of anti-Islamic sentiments is far older than one might think by reading Bunzl’s piece’.

Central to Bunzl’s argument is the shift from nation to civilization. Differentiating Islamophobia from anti-Semitism, he contends that while the latter emerged in conjunction with the nineteenth-century European nation-state formations and the (im)possibility of Jews to be included therein, the former is an upshot of a more recent discourse the pivot of which is the ‘civilization’ of Europe, not the nation-state. He writes:

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7Irfan Ahmad, ‘Haunting the West: Plural Narratives of a Singular Figure’, *Australian Book Review*, March (2011), pp. 56–57.
10Bunzl, op. cit., p. 502.
Islamophobes are not particularly worried whether Muslims can be good Germans, Italians or Danes. Rather, they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Islamophobia, in other words, functions less in the interests of national purification than as a means of fortifying Europe.13

Bunzl’s point that the nation-state stands irrelevant, if not dead, seems to echo Gerard Ruggie’s contention that the current European project of integration reflects ‘unbundling of territoriality’ thus marking a postmodern turn, propelled by globalization.14 In my view, the EU is a ‘rebundling’ of territorialities rather than its ‘unbundling’. Clearly, the EU project does have some novelty. And the novelty lies not in the ‘unbundling’ of territory but unbundling of authority. Nationalism continues to be relevant, rather more important than in the past, both in Europe and elsewhere. In fact, nationalist sentiments have heightened with the processes of globalization. The demands, institutions, and languages of globalization thus don’t subvert but rather dovetail into the ideologies of respective nation-states. Bunzl’s stress on Europe also ignores the fact that pan-European projects are institutionally and legally anchored in the national spaces and authorized by the organs of the nation-state. Though influenced and shaped by the processes and forces outside of it, the nation-state is the site of legal, educational, and economic distributions.15 It is useful to remind ourselves that as a citizen of global south, one applies for visa to a specific nation-state, not to Europe writ large.

More importantly, Bunzl’s dualism between nationalism and civilization is false. Under modernity, it is the nation-state that became the motor and career of civilization. As nations, both the French and British saw themselves as flag-bearers of the (not a) civilization and thus justified colonization of the non-west in terms of civilizing it. Is it not the case that nationalist discourses in the late nineteenth century and subsequently already contained vital elements of civilization and pan-European identity? For instance, August Wilhelm, brother of Fredrick Schlegel, was a German nationalist simultaneously wedded to the ‘European patriotism’.16 Thus d’Appolonia is on the mark when she asserts that ‘one must recognize that there is no necessary contradiction between European ideals and national identities, between European unification and national nationalism’.17 To capture these simultaneous strands of thought, she uses ‘European nationalism’, a term also deployed by Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist who killed over seventy innocent people. To d’Appolonia, ‘European nationalism’ does not have a single meaning as it at once encapsulates the national and the supranational as long as the pivot remains Europe.

Breivik described himself and his like-minded fellows as ‘European nationalists’ (see epigraphs). My point is that discourses of the nation and civilization/Europe don’t have to be diametrically opposed; rather they co-habit together. Bunzl’s own ethnographic evidence

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goes against his dualism between nationalism and civilization. According to the Freedom Party of Austria, where Bunzl conducted his fieldwork, Islam is a threat ‘penetrating Europe’ and, therefore, it needs to be checked ‘both at the national and European level’.\footnote{Bunzl, op. cit., p. 506.} As pointed out by many, national identities and loyalties continue to be salient in Europe; and these identities are not in violation of but mostly in consonance with a European identity.\footnote{Christopher Ansell, ‘Restructuring Authority and Territoriality’ in Christopher Ansell and Giuseppe Di Palma (eds) Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 2–18; Pierre Beckouche, ‘Division of Man, Division of Men: Why is the Territory a Strong Component of Contemporary Collective Identity?’, GeoJournal, 60 (2004), 381–387.} Bunzl’s contention that in the contemporary discourses on Europe the nation-state has gotten replaced by ‘European civilization’\footnote{Bunzl, op. cit., p. 506.} is therefore simply untenable in much the same way as his premise of Europe being driven by ‘secular forces’. We should remind ourselves that the Cold War was not all that secular. ‘The threat of communism was not just to capitalist economic systems, but to Christian society as expressed in western bloc democratic nations’.\footnote{Gary D. Bouma, ‘Religious Resurgence, Conflict and the Transformation of Boundaries’ in Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (eds) Religion, Globalization and Culture (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 187–202; also see Irfan Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), ch. 1.}

**Nation-state as Home: Its Valence and Violence**

Contra Bunzl, if the nation-state continues to be relevant and salient, two things follow. First, nation-state is ultimately a territorial concept: without territory there is no nation-state. Liberalism and democracy, when institutionalized, are also territorial projects. In the words of Walzer: ‘liberalism is above all a domestic theory, designed to address the relationships of individuals to one another and to the state’.\footnote{Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 138.} The same is largely true for the working of democracy; it is territorially anchored. Second, at least since the nineteenth century nation-state has been the prime signature of ‘home’. As a matter of fact we use ‘society’ and ‘nation-state’ interchangeably;\footnote{Anthony Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 191; Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). p. 13.} likewise verily we substitute ‘nation’ and ‘home’. Manning seems to have aptly captured this dynamic between home and nation: ‘The home provides not only a tangible example of how we perpetuate the vocabulary of the nation in our daily utterances, it offers also a visceral instance of our desire for attachment and belonging’.\footnote{Erin Manning, Ephemeral Territories: Representing Nation, Home and Identity in Canada (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), p. xvii.} In fact, one can go a step further to say that knowledge itself is nationalized. Ideally, disciplines like sociology and history were supposed to historicize and sociologize nation-states. However, under the monumental weight of nationalism these disciplines themselves got unrecognizably nation-statized.\footnote{Irfan Ahmad, ‘Anthropology of Nationalism, Nationalism of Anthropology: Notes on the Idea and Practice of Indian Anthropology’, paper presented at the Anthropology Colloquium, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia (20 October 2011); also see Daniel Chernilo, ‘Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9:1 (2006), pp. 5–22.} Consider a few names of the established journals: *British Journal of Sociology, Australian Journal of Political Science, American Journal of Sociology, Contributions to Indian Sociology* and so on. These are not
simply learned journals; they are national journals. Thus knowledge is national.26 Likewise, our use of the term ‘home’ is equally national. What is currently called BBC Radio 4 was previously called ‘Home program’ run under the larger title of Home Service as opposed to the BBC’s Foreign Service.27 As I argue that nation has been mainly conceived as home and vice versa, let me further explain what I mean by it.

Dr Annie Besant is one of those foreigners who inspired the love of the country among Indians. She declared in 1918: ‘I love the Indian people as I love none other. . . My heart and my mind. . . have long been laid on the alter [sic] of the Motherland’. Annie Besant, born of Irish parents in London on 1 October 1847, made India her home from November 1893. Dr Besant started the Home Rule League in India for obtaining the freedom of the country and reviving the country’s glorious cultural heritage.28

This pithy description of Besant, taken from a non-academic nationalist website, illustrates well my point about how nationalism and home are intimate bedfellows. Mohandas Gandhi was part of this drama of Home Rule Movement.29 A theosophist wedded to spiritual politics containing elements of race theories and opposed to adult franchise, sources and resources for Besant’s dream home lay primarily in the history of pre-Muslim India, in the ancient Hindu scriptures and traditions.30 It is this kind of politics of nation and home-making which subsequently resulted into competing demands for Pakistan, the so-called ‘homeland’ of Indian Muslims. ‘One man’s imagined community’ became ‘another man’s political prison’.31 In significant ways, the Partition of India was a historically monumental drama with a series of preceding non-linear acts over the longue durée of colonial-nationalist modernity:

. . . which sought to secure riddance of that which it christened as ‘outcast’; it was the gory manifestation of the dominant theory and practice of Indian nationalism to design a hygienic, orderly home believed to have been contaminated with a threatening outcast — the Muslim ‘Other’.32

The idea of a homeland of Jews is not radically different.

The fantasy of nation is driven by the idea of an orderly, nice, cozy home where heart resides and which heart longs for when it finds itself distant from home. In fact the distance from home may generate more intense longing for it. One of the most powerful expressions of such a longing for home is the nationalist song of Peter Allen, an Australian entertainer of some repute. The song ‘I Still Call Australia Home’ Allen composed became a major hit

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26 For a fuller elaboration of this argument in relation to sociology and Indian nationalism, see Ahmad, op. cit., ‘Anthropology of Nationalism’.
(versions of this song on YouTube have hundreds of thousands of viewers).\(^{33}\) Notably, Allen imagined Australia as ‘home’ primarily in relations to imperial centers such as old London and New York as well as the ‘nature’, the sun and the vast sea. Allen’s song, an ‘Australian classic’, which the Australian airline, Qantas, subsequently used in its ‘hugely popular campaign’ from 1997 to 2009,\(^{34}\) is not merely about Australia as home; it is a white home. As such, it is criminally silent about how this white home has historically been built by demolishing the home of the Aboriginal population. In contrast to Allen’s white racist imagination of an Australian home, Moreton-Robinson, herself an aboriginal Australian, beautifully and poignantly writes about the simultaneous dispossession and homelessness settler colonialism unleashed. ‘The non-Indigenous sense of belonging is inextricably tied to this original theft: through the fiction of Terra Nullius the migrant has been able to claim the right to live in our land’ thereby rendering the indigenous people ‘homeless and out of place’.\(^{35}\) Larissa Behrendt’s *Home* is another powerful attempt to write a different narrative of home as experienced by the Aboriginal actors\(^{36}\) (but for long silenced in the public domain, including in the curricula of Australian schools).\(^{37}\) It should be evident how the politics of home is deeply enmeshed in and reflective of the simultaneous possession and dispossession, both often awfully secured through the greasy arms of law (lawfully).

Home as nation is nearly inconceivable without its constitutive ‘other’ – internal as well as external – from which it needs to be constantly guarded off. At times internal other, to the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (d. 1814) ‘interior frontiers’\(^{38}\) was the essence of the nation, might be regarded as dangerous as the external one. In the wake of India–Pakistan War of 1965, an Indian Urdu poet, Jān nisār akhtar exhorsted Indians, particularly Muslims, with the following words: ‘This [India] is our home; safeguarding (ḥifāẓat) this home is our compulsory duty’.\(^{39}\) This poetic act of claiming India as ‘our home’ has barely met with much success, however. In the winter of early 2002, I was engaged conducting ethnographic fieldwork in India when over 2000 thousands Muslims were killed, in absolute complicity with the government officials, in the western state of Gujarat.\(^{40}\) In the wake of this massacre, a national conference was organized in the north Indian town of Aligarh, the main site of my fieldwork. In the conference a prominent Indian politician said: ‘Muslims should not be considered as tenant

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\(^{39}\) Cited in Jagannath Azad, ‘Hindustān ke tahlīlī ‘anāṣir kī tashkīl mēn Urdu ka hīssa’, *āhang* (Gaya; January 1983), p. 22. The full couplet read as follows: ‘is ḥifāẓat-ī ḥusn parwar kī ḥifāẓat farz hai/ye hamāra ghar hai is ghar kī ḥifāẓat farz hai’.

(किरायेदार) in this country, 

**mulk**’ (this statement made headlines in the local Hindi newspapers).\(^{41}\) That is to say, India is their ‘home’ – does not one also become a tenant in her own home?

The argument I have been developing is further illustrated when we dwell on violence – war and the idea of home by way of exploring the biography of the Indo-European linguistic equivalent of home. To this end, I use the work of the French historical socio-linguist Emile Benveniste. For house the root word in Iranian, Latin, Greek and Sanskrit is _dam, domus, domos_ and _dama_ respectively.\(^{42}\) While noting the commonality across the four languages, Benveniste underlines the difference between its Greek and Latin lexical employment. In Greek it refers to a house as a physical structure and it also has a verbal form meaning ‘to construct’ (the root being _dem_). In Latin, in contrast, _domus_ denotes ‘house’ in the sense of ‘family’ and it has no verbal form.\(^{43}\) Again, in contradistinction to its Greek usage, in Latin _domo, domi, domum_ signify the family and home as a moral, social idea, not as a material one in the sense of a ‘house’.\(^{44}\) The derivative _domi_ means peace and is contrasted with _militiae_ meaning war the purpose of which is to monopolize or expand possession: the possessive pronoun _domus_ signifies ‘possession’. Derived from the common Indo-European root _dem\(^{45}\)_ in Latin, _dama_ in Greek and _damayati_ in Sanskrit means ‘to do violence; to tame’.\(^{46}\) And the logical opposite of _domo/domi_ – home – is the outside or stranger called _foras_ or _foris_.\(^{47}\) What dialectically (dis)connects home and outside is war. After the end of the seventeenth century civil war fought along religious lines in Europe ‘was diverted to the outside, so to speak, and many Absolutist theoreticians saw it as a permanent institution for the prevention of civil war [at home]’.\(^{48}\) Peace at home and war abroad were not seen as contradictory; rather they mutually complimented each other. To better illustrate this constitutive interrelationship between _domi_ and _foris_ let me give a longer quote from Benveniste I have been citing at length:

> We can understand why in Latin _foris_ is the opposite of _domi_; the outside begins at the door and is called _foris_ for the one who is at home, _domi_. This door, according to whether it is open or shut, becomes the symbol for separation from and communication between, one world and the other. It is through the door that the secure and enclosed space… opens on an extraneous and often hostile world… The rites of passage through the door, the mythology of the door, give a religious symbolism to this idea [of home].\(^{49}\)

As this quote shows, in addition to moral and social aspects, the simple yet gigantic entity called home has an inbuilt notion of a hostile ‘outside’ world with a clear territorial anchoring (though Benveniste does not elaborate on the territorial aspects). Territory has Latin origin – ‘_terratorium_, meaning earth (_terra_), and _terrere_ meaning to frighten (suggesting

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\(^{41}\) _Amar uaj al_ (Agra edition), 22 April 2002.

\(^{42}\) Emile Benveniste, _Indo-European Language and Society_, translated by Elizabeth Palmer (London: Faber, 1973), p. 241. I am thankful to Ghassan Hage for directing me to this work.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 243.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., pp. 244–245.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 239.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 251.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 244.


\(^{49}\) Benveniste, op. cit., p. 255.
By the eighteenth century, it acquired a juridical bent connoting property; in fact, territory and property (hence the control over them) became more or less the same thing. The 1789 Constitution of the US authorized the Congress to pass laws 'respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States'. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the term territory became crucial to European politics. With the intensification of the movement of nationalism from the eighteenth century on, territory, nation, and home became almost one and the same. Nationalism generated the idea of citizen inside and alien outside thus inaugurating the field of international studies. It is worth mentioning that it was not 'until Bentham coined the phrase international in late eighteenth century that foreign came to be firmly associated with the different character of other nations'. When used first in the English language, the 'thirteenth-century term chamber foreign referred to private room in a house'. In subsequent centuries the meaning of term foreign as something outside of a definite territory became certain to the extent that any fidelity with it was considered legally punishable and morally reprehensible. Perhaps the best illustration of this complex transformation of European political philosophy is the term 'naturalization'. To join a new nation, one needs to be naturalized. The premise is clear: she who moves from one territory to another becomes 'unnatural'. Hence the oath of allegiance to become a US citizen reads: 'I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely... renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen'.

What I mean by all this is that our thought is notably ontological. In Derrida’s reading, ontology signifies an ‘axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present being... to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general’. It is this solid, holy alliance between ontology and territory-nation, which finds expression in terms such as ‘homeland security’, ‘home ministry’ and ‘home ground’. In sports, ‘home’ means a place of security ‘free from attack by the opposition’; in cricket when a batsman rushes for a run after hitting the ball and he has planted his bat within the crease before the throw from the fielder hits the stumps commentators routinely say ‘the batsman is safely home’. There is no nation without a threatening ‘other’ or what Derrida calls ‘some ghost’. Since I regard ‘home’ and ‘nation’ as largely synonymous, we can likewise think of national culture, national music, national bird, national anthem, national curriculum, national dress, national cuisine, national sports and so on. Even air stands nationalized: think of the airlines – Air France, Air India, Air Italy and British Airways.

It is this notion of home/nation, which informs not only the statements and practices of Islamophobes such as Geert Wilders and Jorg Haider but also many scholarly analyses. In
discussion on Islam in Europe, the most often used term is ‘Muslim presence’. The logical opposite is ‘Muslim absence’. But have not Muslims been present for the last fourteen hundred years? If so, this term means that Muslims have become present now in the territory called France, Italy, the UK or Netherlands. My point is that there is a territorial ideology behind this term ‘Muslim presence’. And this territorial ideology is the idea of home; until recently Muslims have been out there, far-off – in the Middle East, Asia, Africa; now they have come to invade ‘the home’ called Europe, the civilization, or the Netherlands, the nation-state. Some examples are in order here. Effie Fokas writes that the:

... hackneyed dichotomous representation ‘liberal’ versus ‘traditional’, ‘moderate’ versus ‘radical’... Islam are clearly insufficient. A more nuanced approach is necessary, taking into account a number of key factors... including whether Muslim groupings are autochthonous or immigrants.\(^{59}\)

In my view, this is far from a nuanced approach because the alternative of autochthonous and immigrant Fokas proposes is implicated in the language of nation–home–territory thinking. Do words like autochthonous and immigrant make any sense without a prior assumption of what is home and the necessary elements which (un)make it? Fokas urges readers to examine the givenness of a Muslim identity; the same urge is somehow missing in examining what after all is Europe; she takes Europe as a ‘given’. Another example is Jocelyn Cesari who in fact uses the term ‘home’. Applauding that ‘there now exists a French Islam, an English Islam, a Belgian Islam’, she writes that Muslims’ ‘daily concrete practices reveal an acculturation generating a “homemade”... version of Islam’.\(^{60}\)

If analyzed in relation to the distinction between domo/dom and foris/foras I discussed above, Cesari’s argument renders Islam foreign while arguing for a homemade version of Islam. In Melbourne (in 2011), some Muslim women pleaded for a revision of the dress code in swimming pools. It generated heated reaction from the ‘autochthonous’ white women one of whom said, on TV Channel 7, that if Muslim women did not want to confirm to ‘our ways’, they should go ‘home’. Bassam Tibi’s claim that he fathered the term ‘Euro-Islam’\(^{61}\) squarely belongs to this language of home I am unpacking here in the same way as the lament of Xavier Bougarel that there is still not a ‘European’ Islam.\(^{62}\) In the legal domain, America’s 2002 Homeland Security Act is a robust example. Financed by America’s Department of Homeland Security, in 2010, one think tank published a report titled ‘Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats’.\(^{63}\)

In a variety of catalogues and media, this growing theme of ‘Muslims Go Home’ has appeared in the west, including in such important media as YouTube. A YouTube video exposition titled ‘Muslims Go Home’ – with no sound and picture – simply shows a short paragraph of text which simultaneously advises and chastises Muslims in the


\(^{60}\)Jocelyn Cesari, ‘Muslim Identities in Europe: The Snare of Exceptionalism’ in Al-Azmeh and Fokas, op. cit., p. 56, italics added.


following words: ‘Muslims, shut up and grow up, or go home’. This exposition at YouTube is posted by an Australian, Michael Hunt.64

In recent times, the love for home and homeland (domophilia) has indeed become the signature of politics, both in ‘east’ and ‘west’. Take France, for instance. In a 2007 election meeting, Nicolas Sarkozy said: ‘France is our country and we have no other. France is us. It is our heritage. Our common good. Hating her would mean hating ourselves.’65 ‘If foreigners want to remain in France’, he went on, ‘they have to love France; otherwise, they should leave’.66 Having presided over the brutal suppression of Tamil militancy (entailing massive violation of human rights), the triumphant President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, announced joyfully in 2009:

We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary... No longer are the[re] Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and any other minorities. There are only two peoples in this country. One is the people who love this country. The other comprises the small groups that have no love for the land of their birth.67

The need for this declaration of love for home has only increased as we have come to late modernity. If in the last two centuries nation as a territorial entity has been the dominant mode of organizing our lives and thinking, what Marc Auge calls ‘non-places’ of late modernity or supermodernity68 have only accentuated the urge for a definite, familiar

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place, home included. The mythology of a secular Europe – that the quest for a heavenly home has got transformed into an earthly home – does not lessen the love for home. Rather it enhances the love for home in such a way that it assumes divine valence. Steve Bruce, the continuing advocate of Europe’s secularization thesis (which has come under serious doubts in recent scholarship), makes an intriguing argument. In his view, even in a so-called secular society religion can take on non-religious roles of defending a national identity in the face of a national threat. He writes: ‘modernity undermines religion except when it finds some major social role to play other than mediating the natural and super-natural world’.69 Is it the case that religion in the west has come to be invested in the idea of home to serve as the reference point for politics? Geert Wilder’s comment on Turkey’s membership to EU probably exemplifies it cogently. He said: ‘I am against the joining of Turkey [to EU]. I have nothing against Turkey. It is a very respected ally within NATO. … But I believe it is not a member of the family. A good neighbor is not the same as being a member of the family’.70 It scarcely requires mention that Wilder’s usage of family presupposes and reinforces a distinct conceptualization of Europe as home/family which dates back to the eighteenth century when, to quote Koselleck, ‘The Society of European states seems to have been transformed into one large family’.71

So far, I have argued how nation as home has conditioned our thinking of modern politics in general and of Muslims in Europe and India in particular. To this end, I have given short genealogies of the concepts of territory, nation, and home. There is another genealogy of home with which I wish to conclude this section of the article. This genealogy is admittedly preliminary and brief. Thoughts and practices about nation-as-home often assume this vast earth as a stable entity and then proceed to carve out of it a specific piece/tract called home. That is, a segment of human population seeks to build a home – domo – against another segment of population, foris, the strangers. But what if humanity at large becomes strange to itself? Who would, then, be the other against whom the idea of home will become meaningful? Has not the entire earth itself become home? Indeed it has become. It is the atom bomb and the moon landing, the latter enabling the viewing of the globe as an object from elsewhere, which fashioned the concept of a global home linking people – regardless of their multiple diversities – together. Hannah Arendt wrote:

> It is true, for the first time in history all peoples on earth have a common present: no event of any importance in the history of one country can remain a marginal accident in the history of another… Every man feels the shock of events which take place at the other side of the globe.72

With the lethal threat of the atom bomb, for the first time in history it dawned on humans that what was at stake was not the killing of one segment of human population by another but the possibility that humanity itself could commit suicide. This was a new realization in that it questioned the split between domo and foris: either the whole earth is domo or foris: in no way could it be both.73 Surprising though it may seem, Osama bin Laden and Aiman

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70http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBnLa6Llz2g (accessed 12 July 2009).
71Koselleck, op. cit., p. 49.
73Here I am indebted to Faisal Devji’s The Terrorist in Search of Humanity (Delhi: Foundation Books, 2008); my reading of Arendt is somewhat different from Devji’s, however.
Al-Zawahiri exemplify this new realization of home whereas the western plutocracies continue to operate in the old language of home as nation-state or a conglomeration of select western nation-states. In a VDO release of 2011, Al-Qaeda leader Aiman Al-Zawahiri reportedly said: ‘you shall not dream of security until we enjoy it’.74 Zawahiri’s statement was a reiteration of what Osama bin Laden had said after the Madrid bombing of 2005: ‘It is well-known that security is a vital necessity for every human being. We will not let you [the west] monopolize it for yourselves’.75

(In)Conclusion

The dominant liberal explanation for the public visibility of Islamophobia in the west runs as follows: Islamophobia is in some ways a betrayal of west’s liberalism, at least in its ‘pure’, ‘classical’ formulations. Contemporary western legislations embodying Islamophobia is thus explained in terms of employing ‘illiberal means to liberal ends’.76 Islamophobia, I argue, is neither a deviation from nor a distortion of ‘true’ liberalism; Islamophobia is indeed constitutive of western liberalism from its unfolding to the present. In a thoughtful publication, which historically surveys the Cold War and Post-Cold War world in relation to Islam, John Trumpbour concludes: ‘Alas, liberalism as a child of Enlightenment is shot through with Islamophobia’.77 As an example, he cites the views of Voltaire (1694–1778) ‘representing the apogee of Enlightenment reason and tolerance’. To Frederick the Great, Voltaire said: ‘You may still have the pleasure of seeing Muslims chased out of Europe’. And to Catherine the Great, Voltaire unambiguously expressed his ardent desire as follows: ‘I wish I had at least been able to help you kill a few Turks’. ‘It does not suffice to humiliate them’, Voltaire went on, ‘they [Muslims] should be destroyed’.78

Notwithstanding its specificity, the history of Indian liberalism is not vastly different from that of the west. Described as the ‘father of the Indian Renaissance’ and of ‘modern India’, ‘the… Christ of the Indian Renaissance’ and in the words of historian Chris Bayly ‘the first Indian liberal’,79 Rammohun Roy (1772–1833) unambiguously displayed, as did Voltaire more than a century earlier, ample hostility to Islam while showering praise on imperial Britain which had then freshly colonized India. Roy was deeply sad to have seen Hindustan ‘for several centuries subject to Mohammadan Rule, and the civil and religious rights of its original inhabitants being constantly trampled upon’. Mark that, to Roy, Hindus were the ‘original inhabitants’. And Muslims (yaâvana in Bengali)? ‘Provisional inhabitants’ at best! And this is how he liberally welcomed colonialism: ‘Divine Providence at last, in its abundant mercy, stirred up the English nation to break the yoke of those tyrants, and to receive the oppressed Natives of Bengal under its

76Robert Gould, this issue.
78Ibid. Terry Eagleton notes the link between Islamophobia and current advocates of liberalism such as Salman Rushdie and Christopher Hitchens; see Irfan Ahmad, Islam as Critique: Reason, Revelation, Tradition (in progress).
79Ahmad, ‘Modernity and Its Outcast’, p. 483
protection’. As if this was insufficient, Roy went on: ‘Your dutiful subjects have not viewed the English as a body of conquerors, but rather as deliverers, and look up to your Majesty not only as a Ruler, but also as a father and protector’.  

With liberalism yoked to and enshrined into the institutional matrix of the nation-state, Islamophobia began to be embodied in the figure of the ‘Other’ threatening and contaminating the purity, order and coziness of nation, home. India serves as its good illustration. Unlike Muslims in the west (called ‘immigrants’), ancestors of most contemporary Indian Muslims were local Hindus who converted to Islam centuries ago. They are not immigrants/foreigners. In appearance seldom are they distinguishable from the Hindu population. They speak myriad Indian languages. Yet even in current post-colonial India Muslims are regarded as ‘outsiders’ and ‘foreigners’; hence the recurring calls for the ‘Indianization’ of Muslims and Islam. This call for Indianization, spearheaded by Hindu nationalist parties, is not limited to them; it goes far beyond to include even elements of the Left. Three years ago, in 2010, Mr L.K. Advani, key leader of the BJP who narrowly missed being India’s Prime Minister, held that Muslims were not integrated into the nation and that only after the Allahabad High Court’s politicized judgment vindicating the Hindu Right position on the Babri Masjid issue, he said that the judgment opened ‘a new chapter for national integration and a new era for inter-community relations’. The assumption of Muslims not being part of the ‘national mainstream’ abounds in public domain. In order to integrate Muslims into the nation, in 1970, Balraj Madhok, President of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which subsequently became the current BJP, wrote Indianization. Though it also concerned minorities such as Christians, Madhok’s key target was Muslims. He regarded Muslims steeped in backwardness which prevented them from being Indianized. In his scheme, the modernization of Islam was a prerequisite for Indianization of Muslims. The crux of Madhok’s missionary program for an Indian Islam, similar to Bassam Tibi’s Euro-Islam, was that Muslims relinquish their identity and begin to fervently participate in religious-cultural festivals and institutions of Hinduism which he equated with ‘nation’ and which, contra Islam, was modernity embodied. The resolution of the BJS, passed in 1969, read: ‘Indianization – by which we mean the subordination of all narrow loyalties like those of religion, caste, region, language, or dogma to the overriding loyalty to the nation’. That Islam is foreign and Muslims are outsider to India has been imbibed by many Muslims themselves. Salman Khurshid, an important leader of the Congress party and a lawyer, titled his book At Home in India: A Restatement of Indian Muslims.  

If we compare the condition of Indian Muslims with that of Muslims in the west it becomes apparent that the discourse of integration has serious limits. It thrives regardless of the ‘facts’ of integration – whatever its indicator; linguistic competence, for instance. The discourse of integration and the related premise of separatism derive their power

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81 Gandhi too seemed to hold such a view; see the 1944 correspondence between Gandhi and Jinnah in K.M. Ashraf, *Hindu—Muslim Question and Our Freedom Struggle*, vol. 2 (Delhi: Sunrise, 2005), appendix 6.  
and nourishment from the a priori home which Muslims are invited to/ordered to get integrated into. And this home/nation is enacted, felt and performed, for instance in the media, with the reigning binaries of insider/outsider, autochthonous/immigrants, and internal/external. These binaries are not bare words; they are powerful weapons which at once reproduce and fashion specific histories, emotions, sensibilities, aesthetics, memories, and blueprints for the vistas of future. Muslims are depicted as outsiders not because they don’t fit in the pre-designed home but the premise is that howsoever they try they can probably never fit in the home; Muslims’ culture/religion sets them apart from ‘us’ who have unique and superior values. For home to remain home there needs to be a non-home, foras/foris, which precisely is the function Muslims in Europe (also the USA), India and elsewhere have been asked to perform in the figure of ‘outsiders’, ‘alien’ and so on. Every articulation of Islamophobia is in significant ways at the same time also the declaration of love for home, domophillia.

The fear and anxiety that Muslims, rather than getting integrated into ‘our ways of life’ remain ‘separate’ from us and thereby aim to impose ‘their’ culture on ‘ours’, historically speaking, is less about the fact of Muslims’ integration in the west and more about the past of the westerners themselves who in the vast colonies rarely got integrated into the local cultures and maintained an umbilical link with their respective imperial ‘homes’. Seldom did the settler Anglo population in Australia, for instance, integrate into the local Aboriginal moorings. Having unsettled the Aboriginals, the Anglos settled in Australia only to continue to think of England as their ‘original’ home, mother country. The intense debates over the forms, contents and styles of observing Christmas in the antipodes demonstrate it eloquently. Like in England, during Christmas the settler Anglo community continued to make and serve hot pudding and roasted beef in the torridly hot climate of Australia. Christmas cards with scenes of hills covered in white snow were sold in a fairly warm December of Australia. For the settler Anglo community hot pudding was the link to its imperial home; culture of sentiment triumphed over the environment. Empire and religion fused together so as to institute a separation between the culture of the colonized and that of the colonizers. ‘Even on the outskirts of Empire’, it was observed in the 1920s, ‘someone prepare[s] the dinner for the day which links together the Christian world’. The dinner would but include hot pudding.

Likewise, today when the Dutch complain about the lack of integration by its population of the Moroccan extraction, a historian may hear the echoes from the colonial Dutch settlement in South Africa where the Dutch (called Afrikaners) were the least integrated into the local society and culture. As God’s ‘chosen people’ they loathed the local black

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The story of the Dutch settlement during the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth century in the present-day Kerala (India) is similar. The Dutch and Eurasian populations were rarely integrated into the local society. There were two separate settlements: ‘Fort Cochin (Cochim de Baixa)’ where company officials, free burghers, their associates and dependents lived and ‘native Cochin (Cochim de Cima)’ of mostly local population. The lack of integration into the local society by the British colonial officers in India was evident, inter alia, from the notices at their residences: ‘natives and dogs not allowed’. J.S. Furnivall theorised such practices in the concept of plural society where different segments of the population met only ‘in market places, in buying and selling’.

Many have recognized the violence that the discourse of nation/home routinely enacts. Terms like minority and majority are central to this vocabulary of violence. Connolly thus proposes a shift ‘from a majority nation presiding over numerous minorities... to a democratic state of multiple minorities contending and collaborating with a general ethos of forbearance’. Similarly, Talal Asad argues that ‘Muslims in Europe... should be able to find representation as a minority in a democratic state that consists only of minorities’. Connolly’s and Asad’s suggestions seem valuable for they unsettle the notion of majority. In my view, they don’t go far enough to adequately question the ubiquity and foundation of the nation. As long as the nation or home remains the pivot of our classification and thinking (should one say, ‘unthinking’?), the fear of, violence against and demonization of Muslims – in short, Islamophobia – will likely continue. I thus suggest: let us begin to think of the nation, rather the world at large, as a hotel. A hotel does not usually run along the dark logic of autochthony and belonging. Perhaps because of this, Kafka admired hotels. In a letter, he wrote to his friend Max Brod:

I like hotel rooms; I am at home at once in hotel rooms, more than at home, really.

Kafka’s words are remarkable: in contrast to Germany’s Gudrun, India’s BJP and Norway’s Anders Behring Breivik with whom I began this article, Kafka felt more at home in a hotel than actually at home. As you will recognize, I employ ‘hotel’ as a working metaphor, not as a sealed territorial entity denuded of solidarity and an ethos of sociability. To readers who still might get this impression, let me alternatively whisper ‘hostel’.

**Notes on Contributor**

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